Peace Courier Jan/Feb 2001

The undersigned groups are writing to Alexander Downer to express their extreme concern over the growing commitment of the Bush administration to the National Missile Defence proposal, and to urge that the Australian government:

We draw your attention to the letter written on 20 September 2000, and signed by 64 environment groups, peace groups, church groups, trade unions and parliamentarians, asking that the facilities at Pine Gap not be used for NMD purposes, and to the letter signed by 354 NGOs and parliamentarians worldwide, asking President Clinton not to proceed with NMD.

We also draw your attention to the Australian Senate resolution on NMD of 29th June 2000.

National Missile Defence has been opposed by 354 NGOs and Parliamentarians worldwide, by 50 Nobel Laureates within the United States and by a declaration of retired military personnel and religious leaders at Washington National Cathedral, as well as by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the governments of most US allies especially France and Germany, by the New Agenda Coalition and the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) groups in the UN, and has been very strongly opposed by the governments of Russia and China, who increasingly view it as directed at themselves and not at so-called "states of concern" such as North Korea and Iraq.

NMD has failed two out of three operational tests it has undergone, and the success of the first test seems to have been a lucky fluke. Physicists who have studied the technical aspects of the proposal say it cannot be made to work.

It has become more clear with the recent deployment of more Topol-M missiles, and the rumoured deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad, that Russia will increase its nuclear weapons capacity to counterbalance the deployment of NMD. This will lead to a much more confrontational attitude to the US.

Russia has stated that if NMD proceeds, all arms control agreements between it and the US will be moot, and its ratification of START-II is dependent on NMD not proceeding.

China has stated it will dramatically increase its currently limited land-based ICBM deployment from 20 missiles to around 200 missiles if NMD (or TMD) is deployed. At stake is the fulfilment by the nuclear weapons countries of their commitments to the "total and unequivocal elimination" of their nuclear weapons arsenals. This objective is not only a condition of human survival, but is now technically and politically possible as demonstrated by the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention circulated by the United Nations.

Russia has offered a START-III agreement at very low warhead numbers (1500 each), and if the US and Russian commitments at the NPT Review Conference and the most recent UNGA session are to be taken seriously, these offers should be accepted. Bush has in his own electoral campaign, committed to "deep cuts" in US warhead numbers.

NMD makes these encouraging possibilities doubtful, and may return the world to the dark days of nuclear arms racing that characterized the cold war.

Such a development would be highly dangerous. Accordingly, the undersigned Australian NGOs and Parliamentarians have committed to oppose NMD.

The Minister for Defence wrote to us on October 24th that "we do not believe the NMD system currently envisaged would be strategically destabilizing or pose a threat to nuclear deterrence".

However, there are now strong indications that the new Bush administration is proposing a much more ambitious system than that contemplated by the Clinton administration, which would be even more destabilizing. (Guardian, UK, Jan 9).

There may also be pressure on the administration to make a decision on commencing construction of an X-band radar system at Shemya in the Aleutians by March, and to give warning of withdrawal from the ABM treaty by the end of the year. (NYT Jan 9th)

Australia is directly connected with NMD via our joint facilities at Pine Gap. It is generally accepted that the agreement of US allies is essential for NMD to proceed, where it involves the use of joint facilities such as Pine Gap, Fylingdales, or Thule.

The Australian government stated in a letter dated 24 Oct, that the Pine Gap facility's main function is early warning, and that early warning data is necessary with or without NMD, and cannot be used to guide NMD or TMD interceptors.

It would be reassuring to know that no requests have been received or are likely to be received, for upgrades that would allow this capacity. Such upgrades will be required at Thule and Fylingdales to allow NMD to proceed.

Critical to an expanded NMD mission would be the replacement of the current satellite early-warning system by a SBIRS (Space-based Infrared Radar System) - High, and an SBIRS - Low system that WILL allow detailed tracking capacity integral to the operation of a projected NMD or TMD system.

Australia should refuse to cooperate in upgrades or changes to Pine Gap architecture that would allow or facilitate NMD or TMD.

The undersigned groups reiterate that Australia should: - Refuse to allow the use of joint facilities in modes that facilitate NMD or TMD, and notify the US government of that promptly - Should make vigorous representations to US to urge them not to proceed with NMD or TMD - Should join with other US allies and most other nations, in opposing NMD and TMD diplomatically.

Letter written by John Hallam, Friends of the Earth and signed by many peace and environmental groups and politicians.

Proposed visit by French nuclear vessel (back to top)

Dear Defence Minister Moore, I am writing to make clear the opposition of the undersigned groups and parliamentarians to a proposed visit by either French nuclear submarine, or any other nuclear warship.

The undersigned groups find it extraordinary that the government even contemplates allowing a visit by a French nuclear-armed or nuclear powered warship. We understand that Dr Brabin-Smith has told the Senate Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence committee that France has requested a visit by a nuclear powered submarine and SSN in March this year. The undersigned groups would object strongly to visits by nuclear powered or nuclear armed vessels from any country, but particularly France. We believe that such visits are always inappropriate, inconsistent with commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons, and inconsistent with the idea of a nuclear free southern hemisphere. A visit from a French vessel would be especially so.

It would be hardly possible to forget that when France performed a series of nuclear tests in 1995/6 there was massive public outrage.

More recently, when Australia joined the UK, the US and China in voting at the United Nations General Assembly for the New Agenda Coalition's resolution to eliminate nuclear weapons, France joined with Russia in abstaining. France also declined to vote for the Australian / Japanese resolution on the same subject, which attracted wide support. (Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.)

At the same session of the United Nations General Assembly, Australia also voted in favour of a Nuclear Free Southern Hemisphere, which France voted against, together with the UK and the US.

Mr Downer has already been sent a letter in which we congratulate him on Australia's vote on the Nuclear Free Southern Hemisphere, the New Agenda Resolution, and the Japan / Australia resolution on the Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. These positive and helpful votes would be undermined by any invitation to a French nuclear armed vessel to visit any port in Australia.

France's overall obstructiveness to the agenda of the elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide must enter into consideration of any proposed nuclear vessel visiting Australia. In view of the history of French nuclear testing, and in the light of its obstructive attitude to nuclear disarmament initiatives, a French nuclear warship visit seems especially inappropriate.

There are also real concerns over the safety of nuclear-powered ships, that will not be resolved by any purely technical arrangements arrived at between France and Australia.

You will be aware of the problems that have been experienced recently by UK Hunter-Killer submarines, with the Tireless stranded in Gibraltar with severe problems in its nuclear reactor. You must also be aware of the strong negative reaction of the people of Gibraltar to the presence of a defective nuclear submarine

It seems that the French Hunter-Killer submarines, the Rubin-Amethyste class, the type for which we understand a visit is envisaged, have experienced similar problems. One of them has been withdrawn from service in order to have a complete replacement of its reactor core after the discovery of elevated radiation levels in primary coolant circuits. There have been three major nuclear submarine related problems this year, including the Kursk disaster. We also understand that safety problems exist with the French nuclear aircraft carrier.

A visit by a French nuclear armed or powered vessel will be publicly perceived as provocative, as potentially unsafe, and at odds with vital diplomatic goals, namely that of a nuclear free southern hemisphere.

John Hallam, Friends of the Earth Australia Irene Gale AM, Australian Peace Committee SA Babs Fuller-Quinn APC Sydney and many other peace groups and politicians

Report on the National Convention on Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (back to top)

A number of Australian groups gave me financial assistance to attend the National Convention on Nuclear Disarmament and Peace that took place in Delhi, from 11 to 13 November, 2000. The convention has been the result of months of planning stemming from a meeting in Nagpur six months previously. A wide range of NGOs were involved in the preparation process, with major logistical work in Delhi (accommodating the 500 or so delegates, moving them around Delhi), being done by Delhi Science Forum.

The main organisers of the conference were Praful Bidwai, and Achin Vanalk, both of whom have played a prominent role in the Indian movement against nuclear weapons.

The meeting came as India and Pakistan, some two and a half years after the blasts at Pokhran and Chagal (Baluchistan) are poised to make decisions as to what to do with their respective nuclear deterrents - decisions that may have a fateful impact on the two countries.

India seems to be planning a "minimum deterrent" of 150 to 200 warheads, with major undecided questions over whether it should sign the CTBT, and over the precise kind of command and control system it should use. Pakistan faces similar sorts of choices.

These questions are hardly trivial, as missile flight times from Pakistan to Delhi (and from Indian sites to Islamabad) range from seven to two minutes, rather than the thirty minutes or so that the USA and Russia have.

This means that if there is a false alarm, such as has happened 20,000 times in the US between 1977 and 1984, and numerous times in Russia, there is literally no time at all to discover if it is indeed a false alarm. A "launch on warning" posture such as is maintained by the US and Russia would thus result in mutual suicide.

Computer projections of possible India / Pakistan nuclear "exchanges" give casualty numbers that range widely, depending on whether they happen during the monsoon, when the prevailing winds blow back over Pakistan, or during the cold season, when they will blow the other way, over India. With the wind blowing over Pakistan, there would be about 40 million deaths; with the winds blowing over the densely populated plains of North India, up to 150 million deaths. An exchange with existing weapons configurations (deployed on planes) would most likely cause the complete destruction of Delhi, Bombay, most northern and western Indian cities, most state capitals and ALL Pakistani cities.

An Indian strategic analyst with whom I lunched at a place where uniformed waiters salute you, said casually that in a nuclear exchange with India, Pakistan "would be wiped out" while India "would lose one or two cities". I asked him how he felt about losing Delhi or Bombay.

The same analyst suggested that, while India might eventually sign the CTBT, it would very likely want to perform at least one more underground test before it did so. India, while it claims to have developed thermonuclear weapons, may have got no further than "fusion boosted" weapons, and will in any case want, if it is to use the CTBT as the US and France do, to perform subcritical nuclear tests, want more explosive data before it does so. Current Indian capabilities seem to be to produce weapons up to 200 kilotons: a respectable fission yield, and enough for military requirements, but not yet the size of an average thermonuclear weapon.

India and Pakistan are both in the process of developing long-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. In order to attack each other, they need have however, nothing more than medium-range missiles.

It was against this grim background that 500 people including 50 from Pakistan, met. I was lucky enough to be housed in the Indian Social Institute, where the Pakistani delegates stayed, and witnessed what was in a way the most important single event of the entire conference - the very warm embraces and greetings, conveyed in a truly "old world" style, between the Pakistani delegates and their Indian colleagues, whose governments had tried to keep them apart. The simple fact that this was able to happen at all was of the highest significance.

The conference attracted media attention, with a prominent and very positive editorial / opinion piece in the Hindustan Times.

Reading it at breakfast, I was in the odd position of asking the name of the delegate I was with, seeing the by-line, and saying "but that's you". I'd been sitting drinking coffee with him for an hour.

Indians do things in style, and a conference like this will have plenty of "Tamasha". Indians love a performance - and the conference was full of zany performing groups doing satirical ditties in Hindi about the "Bomb", including a couple that involved Prime Minister Vajpayee and General Musharraf, dancing arm in arm, waving bombs.

The conference opening featured novelist Arundhati Roy, and Anti-Dam activist Medha Patkar, whose message was in part that those who gave you the big dams also gave you the bomb.

Following that were a series of parallel workshops in one of which I was asked to give a paper on nuclear doctrines, peace, and security. Other topics included CTBT, FMCT, and de-alerting, Indian draft nuclear doctrine, weaponisation of South Asia, and militarization and the scientific establishment. Discussion was intense and there was not enough time.

Themes that emerged during the early part of the conference were the "myth" of deterrence, the extreme danger of the India / Pakistan standoff, and the need to bring Indian and Pakistani weapons levels down to zero. The need for the Indian and Pakistani movements to coordinate was strongly emphasized.

There was some discussion of the role of nuclear power and uranium mining vis a vis weapons, but in many peoples view not enough - especially as India is poised to commence construction of two VVER1000 reactors at Koodankulam on the southern tip of the country, as well as an ambitious program of domestic CANDU - style reactors. However, there were videos of uranium mining at Jaduguda, as well as of Pokhran.

The conference ended after three intense and moving days, with the adoption of a "draft charter" whose main points included:

A large number of administrative matters including the creation of a national organizing body in Delhi were discussed and agreed.

The significance of the conference. The main significance of this conference in my own view, is simply that it took place. That fact, and the fact that it was very well attended and generated media attention in Delhi will do much to put new life into India's anti-nuclear movement.

For this delegate, it was a very valuable opportunity to meet people I'd only seen in cyberspace, to meet both international delegates (Kate Dewes, Jackie Cabasso, Jaya Tiwari, Rob Green, Dave Knight) and an immense number of Indian and Pakistani delegates whose cards I am still sorting through.

My congratulations to those who organized it not only for doing an excellent job with the logistics, but for creating a most memorable occasion that will hopefully be remembered as a turning point in opposition to nuclear weapons and nuclear power in India.

A Balloon could fool Son of Star Wars (back to top)

by David Wright and Lizbeth Gronlund

The controversial "Son of Star Wars", the National Missile Defence (NMD) System is now back on the US agenda with the selection of Mr. Donald Rumsfeld* as Defence Secretary in George W Bush's cabinet. Will this system work?

The chief difficulty in developing missile defences is not in getting a system of complex hardware to work as intended, although that is a daunting task. The key problem is that the defence has to work against an enemy that is aware of the system and deliberately trying to foil it. Even if the planned technology worked perfectly (a big if), the attacker could defeat the system by taking relatively simple steps, called countermeasures, that would confuse or overwhelm the defence.

Countermeasures require technology that is much simpler than the technology needed for the defence. This inherent asymmetry means an attacker would have an advantage, despite the overwhelming technological edge the United States has over any potential attacker such as North Korea.

These are the conclusions of a year long study organized by the Union of Concerned Scientists and the MIT Security Studies Program. Study participants included eleven physicists and engineers, seven of whom have served as senior consultants to the Defence Department. The study report discusses the architecture of the planned missile defence system in detail and gives an overview of the types of countermeasures an attacker might use to foil this defence. We found that readily available countermeasures would defeat the fully deployed NMD system.

For example, a country that decided to deliver biological weapons by ballistic missile could divide the lethal agent into 100 or more small bombs, known as "bomblets", as a way of dispersing the agent over the target. This would overwhelm the defence, which would deplete its supply of interceptors before it ran out of warheads to shoot at.

An attacker launching missiles with nuclear warheads would have different options. It could disguise the warhead by hiding it in an aluminium coated Mylar balloon and releasing it with a large number of empty balloons. In the vacuum of space, all of these would travel with the same speed and none of the missile defence sensors would be able to tell which balloon held the warhead. And again, the defence would have insufficient interceptors to shoot at all of them.

Or the warhead could enclosed in a thin covering cooled with liquid nitrogen. This would make it invisible to the heat seeking interceptors the defence will use.

These are only three of many possible countermeasures. And none of these ideas is new; most have been around as long as ballistic missiles themselves have.

The NMD system, as currently planned, cannot be modified to address these problems. The current design relies on an interceptor colliding with the warhead in the vacuum of space. Modifying the system to be able to destroy multiple bomblets or balloons would require redesigning the entire system, essentially starting from scratch.

Some supporters of national missile defence argue that countermeasures are too difficult for a country like North Korea. Our study shows in detail that this argument is wrong. A 1999 report by the US intelligence community warned that such emerging missile states would be able to use "readily available technology" to develop countermeasures and could do so by the time they develop any missile.

The Pentagon says it must walk before it can run, and has divided the missile defence problem into two parts: getting the system to work against missiles without realistic countermeasures, and then hoping to get it to work against missiles with countermeasures. Few doubt the first step could eventually be done.

But the second step, getting the defence to work against countermeasures, is the one that matters. Our study shows in detail that the planned defence will never be able to run.

Unfortunately, the entire debate in Washington revolves around only the first step. This situation is not unlike someone deciding to build a bridge to the moon. But instead of assessing the feasibility of the full project before moving forward, they decide to start building the on ramps, since that's the part they know how to do.

The reality is that any country capable of building a long-range missile would also have the capability to build countermeasures able to penetrate the planned defence.

If the Pentagon disagrees with our analysis, it should explain what is wrong with it. Otherwise the government should refrain from any decision to deploy this missile defence system.

(David Wright and Lisbeth Gronlund are UCS senior staff scientists. For more information visit the UCS website at www.ucsusa.org/arms

*President Bush has described Mr. Rumsfeld as a man of "great judgment and strong vision". "He is going to be a great Secretary of Defence - again, he knows the challenges awaiting him and will do an outstanding job of strengthening and modernizing our armed forces." Which translates as, more and more money for the defence budget because two years ago Mr. Rumsfeld headed a government commission that concluded that intelligence services had underestimated the security against the US.

Bush promises allies Star Wars Shield by Ben Fenton in Washington (back to top)

George W Bush rekindled the debate over the Star Wars missile defence system when he said that as president he would ensure that an anti-nuclear umbrella would protect Britain and other NATO allies in addition to the United States.

The National Missile Defence, which is still being tested and over which serious technical doubts remain, is at present planned to protect the US alone from missiles launched by a rogue country such as North Korea.

Washington's NATO allies have expressed concern, saying the system would destabilize the world by undermining the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia without providing significant additional protection for Europe.

France and Germany have voiced particularly strong objections, with France's Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine, citing it as another example of US attempts to impose its "hegemony" on the rest of the world. Britain has been more cautious, but privately British diplomats in Washington have been trying to dissuade their allies from the policy.

The conservatives favour the system and have courted senior members of Mr Bush's Republican party with an eye to achieving inclusion for Britain under the nuclear umbrella if and when the system is shown to work. President Bush's promise to extend protection to allies, including Israel, showed no immediate signs of healing the rift.

Prominent scientists have expressed deep scepticism about National Missile Defence which, unlike the space station laser beam systems of Ronald Reagan's original Star Wars programme, is fired from the ground.

In his first big speech on nuclear weapons policy President Bush said: "A missile defence system should not only defend our country. It should defend our allies."

He criticized the Clinton White House for hurrying a decision on the system and said he would deploy it as long as he could be assured that it would work. President Bush also said he would make unilateral cuts in the size of the US nuclear arsenal and seek similar cuts from Russia to reflect the fact that the missiles were "expensive relics of dead conflicts".

Middle East spends £7 billion on weapons (back to top)

by Simon Scott Plummer

The Middle East remained the world's biggest regional arms market in 1999, with purchases worth more than £10 billion the International Institute for Strategic Studies reported. Top of the buyers was Saudi Arabia, with £4.3 billion. Behind it came Israel with #1 billion, though that figure does not include £1.3 billion for procurement the country received under US Foreign Military Financing.

Of the hardline Islamic countries, Iran spent £334 million and Syria £38 million, compared with expenditure in 1987 of £1.6 billion and £1.9 billion respectively. The London based think reports the figures in it annual Military Balance. Figures for Iraq, which is subject to a UN arms embargo, were not available.

US recognises Health Effects from the Cold War (back to top)

Tim Takaro MD.

Over the past year, hundreds of US nuclear weapons workers and their families provided public testimony to the Secretary of Energy about the health impacts of nearly 60 years of Cold War production. The often wrenching testimony about devastated lives was followed by the publication of a summary of existing scientific studies by the National Economic Council, which documented health impacts in the workforce on a population basis.

Thousands of workers were put at risk by the chemical and radiological hazards of weapons development testing, and production. While the total numbers of workers is unknown, the Department of Energy (DOE) acknowledges more than 60,000 former employees, and now admits that there were thousands of illnesses and deaths due to exposures from work at DOE facilities.

Thousands of other workers in private companies were also involved in dangerous weapons production work, and communities around the weapons facilities have been affected. The full extent of past and existing health impacts is still unknown and investigations are only beginning for some populations.

Each of DOE's 12 largest sites shows increased mortality for one or more radiation related cancers. In addition, a four year pilot surveillance program of former DOE workers has identified more than a quarter-million workers who are at risk for occupational diseases derived from weapons work. In the first thousand workers examined, nearly half have abnormal chest x-rays. More than fifteen percent show evidence of pulmonary fibrosis. Asbestos, silica, beryllium and probably other exotic metal exposures contributed to this morbidity.

Rates of significant noise-induced hearing loss are as high as 80 percent, and the majority of the workers require additional medical follow-up.

These workers represent only the most obvious populations at risk. Hundreds of small private contractors were also used for dangerous weapons work, particularly in the decade of production 1943 to 1953.

These companies, often located in urban areas, exposed workers and the surrounding communities to radiation and chemical hazards. For example, Harshaw Chemical in Cleveland, Ohio released up to 4,000 pounds of radioactive uranium fluoride into the air every year during that period. While more than 50 sites require cleanup, many contaminated sites have been abandoned by the government and will need to be revisited.

In September, last year, USA Today published a list of 150 sites around the US where private companies did work for the nuclear weapons program.

Presently the US spends more than $6 billion a year cleaning up its Cold War legacy. Congressional appropriations have remained flat for the past five years, however, and public health needs at the sites have not been met.

Slowly, the last half-century of closely held government secrets regarding the health risks associated with weapons development are being told. Studies continue to demonstrate new health effects such as immunologically based chronic beryllium disease in nuclear workers and reports of radiation related illness continue to mount.

In an interview with the USA Today (Sept 6, 2000), the past Energy Secretary Richardson acknowledged. "Over the years, both the government and the contractors were not candid with the workers and the public about the potential contamination as well as the cleanups. We need to construct and preserve the history of some of the sites. If we find historic sites that need to be cleaned up, I believe the government is obliged to do just that. And it is time we pay workers if they are sick because of their work."

The information that emerges from these efforts should contribute substantially to our understanding of the human and ecological cost of weapons production around the world. Nuclear weapons development, testing and production is continuing in secret, and by governments determined to produce weapons.

The acknowledgment by the US that its weapons program has caused substantial environmental and health damage provides further compelling evidence that nuclear weapons kill before detonation. Dr. Tim Takaro is a Clinical Assistant Professor at the University of Washington's Environment and Occupational health Program. Source: Vital Signs

John Howard should say "Sorry" (back to top)

The people of Australia owe an apology to those of our fellow citizens who were separated from their families as a direct act of government policy. John Howard as Australia's representative should be the one to deliver this apology.

Firstly, the fact that many people that by saying sorry we are taking the blame for what happened. There is a difference between saying sorry and taking the blame. By saying sorry to the Aborigines we are saying that we regret what has happened in the past and we will make sure that it does not happen again in the future.

Parents today make their children apologize for taking pens, pencils and clothing. Yet we as a nation refuse to apologize for snatching children from their mother's arms, for stealing their future and for naming a whole generation "Stolen". How can we reinforce this worldwide gesture of saying sorry if we ourselves do not do so?

Every year we thank the World War veterans and all those who fought and lost their lives for our sake, for our future; we take pride in being able to say "Our ancestors fought for our freedom and make our future better". If we can do this, if we can say thankyou to our ancestors and take pride in doing so then why can't we, in the same state of mind, say sorry for something they did. Say that we acknowledge what happened and we promise you it will never happen again.

There are some quotes taken from Aborigines that were part of "The Stolen Generation".

"I remember all we children being herded up, like a mob of cattle, and feeling the humiliation of being graded by the colour of our skins for the government record." - Confidential submission 332, Queensland women removed in the 1950s to Cootamundra Girls' Home.

"They would not let us kiss our father goodbye, I will never forget the sad look on his face. He was unwell and he worked very hard all his life as a timber-cutter. That was the last time I saw my father, he died two years after." - Jennifer, Bringing them Home, Full Report.

"I remember when my sister came down to visit me and I was reaching out. There was no one there. I was just reaching out and I could see her standing there, and I couldn't tell here that I'd been raped. And I never told anyone for years and years and years. I've been sexually abused, harassed and finally raped, y'know, and I've never had anyone to talk to about it... nobody, no father, no mother, no-one. That's why I hit the booze. None of that family bonding, nurturing - nothing. We had nothing." - Confidential Evidence 248, South Australia; woman removed as a baby in the 1940s to Colebrook, raped at 15 years in a work placement organized by Colebrook.

"There's still a lot of unresolved issues with me. One of the big ones as I cannot really love anyone no more. I'm sick of being hurt. Every time I used to get close to anyone they were just taken away from me. The other fact is, if I did meet someone, I don't want to have children cos I'm frightened the welfare system would come back and take my children." - Confidential Evidence 528, New South Wales: man removed at 8 years in the 1970s; suffered sexual abuse in both the orphanage and foster homes organized by the church.

"The youngest member of our family, Jill, was perhaps more traumatized through all this process because she grew up from the age of nine months being institutionalized the whole time. She actually had some major trauma illnesses and trauma manifestations of institutional life evident in her life and yet nobody knew the root of it, or the cause of it, let alone knew the remedy to it. (The cottage mother) used a lot of mental cruelty on Jill - I mean, through cutting all her hair off at one time to exert authority and to bring submission and fear into you... Making the kids look ugly and dress like boys. She did that to the younger children - well, Jill in particular because she was younger and more impressionable. Jill died because of these policies in law. She committed suicide. She was 34 and death was the better thing." - Confidential Evidence 265, Victoria.

"Almost half of the Aboriginal people who died in custody and were investigated by the Black Deaths Royal Commission had been removed from their families as children... " - Kirsten Garret, Background Briefing, Sunday 11 February 1996.

How can we, as human beings, do nothing to compensate these horrible and traumatizing incidents that have happened in the past to these innocent people and we walk away guilt free?

The strong and healthy bond that a child develops towards family in the early years is the foundation for future relationships with others, and for physical, social and psychological development. When a child has a strong and healthy attachment to family, both trust in others and reliance on self can develop. Most families provide growing children with stories of their past that help them gain a sense of self, belonging and sense of history.

The evidence establishes that attachment occurs in infancy and that the disruption to the process of attachment at this stage of development is most damaging. Between one half and two thirds of children forcibly removed were removed in infancy (before the age of five). The following table summarizes the available information on age of removal among clients surveyed by the Aboriginal Legal Service of WA and among witnesses to the Inquiry.

Age at Removal	Number removed	Inquiry Witnesses
0-2	57 11.8%	111 29.9%
3-5	137 28.4%	97 26.1%
6-10	147 30.4%	86 23.2%
11-15		34 9.2%
not recorded		43 11.6%
TOTAL	483 100 %	371 100%

I hope now that you, if you did not at the start, wish to apologize to those who suffered the pain and trauma of "The Stolen Generation". If not I hope these words change your mind.

Many parents throughout the world lose young children, mostly through illness. It seems that a mother's anguish is a fire that smoulders without end. Imagine how you would feel to have a child of yours ripped off your arms, with no warning, no explanation. Imagine too, the fear of a young child taken away from familiar places.

An apology says "This should not have happened; this should never happen again". It doesn't say "I was there and I let it happen; I am guilty". It says instead "I want my peers and descendants to know I am aware of these wrongs and am doing something to redress, in part, some of them.

This will not heal the wounds but will, at least, give hope that through our standing up as a nation, it won't happen again. Surely it would comfort you too, if that happened to you.

The people of Australia owe an apology to those of our fellow citizens who were separated from their families as a direct act of government policy. Sacha Edema, 11 1/2 years, pupil of St Catherine's School, Sydney

January / February 2001

Australians oppose National Missile Defence (back to top)